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ABSTRACT
Private data matching between the data sets of two poten-
tially distrusted parties has a wide range of applications.
However, existing solutions have substantial weaknesses and
do not meet the needs of many practical application scenar-
ios. In particular, practical private data matching applica-
tions often require discouraging the matching parties from
spoofing their private inputs. In this paper, we address this
challenge by forcing the matching parties to “escrow” the
data they use for matching to an auditorial agent, and in
the “after-the-fact” period, they undertake the liability to
attest the genuineness of the escrowed data.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
H.2.8 [Information Systems]: Database Management—
Database Applications
General Terms: Security
Keywords: Data privacy, Secure multi-party computation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Private data matching considers the scenarios that two
parties each having a set of data objects wish to determine
the objects common to their data sets, while without re-
vealing any additional information to each other. Private
data matching could be either symmetric in the sense that
both parties are interested in the matching result, or asym-
metric in that one party gets the matching result and the
other party is only interested to assist its counterpart for
matching.
In general, private data matching belongs to the secure
multi-party computation problems, where two parties with
respective private inputs x and y compute a function f(x, y)
in such a way that each of them learns nothing other than
the value of f(x, y). However, private data matching in prac-
tice needs to address issues beyond the scope of secure multi-
party computation. More speciﬁcally, given x and y secure
multi-party computation concerns with the way f(x, y) is
computed that does not reveal x and y, whereas practical
private data matching needs to additionally guarantee that
the two matching parties’ private inputs x and y are gen-
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uine, i.e., x and y are indeed the data owned by the two
parties. As a result, while sharing certain generic properties
of secure multi-party computation, private data matching in
practice has an extra dimension to consider, i.e., to prevent
the matching parties from spooﬁng their private inputs.
A weakness of many existing works on private matching
such as [1, 5, 7] is that they assume the two matching parties
follow semi-honest behaviors [6], which, among others, stipu-
lates that the matching parties do not spoof their private in-
puts. This appears to be too strong an assumption for many
data matching applications. The reference [8] gave several
protocols to address input spooﬁng by the two matching
parties, but it has changed the implication of private data
matching in the sense that data objects of equal values as
well as originating from the same users are matched (private
data matching by deﬁnition actually refers to matching data
objects of equal values).
2. OUR APPROACH
We propose an “after the fact” detection approach to de-
ter the matching parties from spooﬁng their inputs. More
speciﬁcally, we assume an auditing mechanism within our
system that takes the responsibility for overseeing the data
matching transactions: the matching parties may share a
single auditorial agent or each matching party (or a group
of matching parties) has an independent auditorial agent
based on, e.g., administrative domains. For simplicity, we
assume all parties have a single auditorial agent in the se-
quel. In the process of data matching, each matching party
“escrows” the data objects it uses for matching to the au-
ditorial agent, i.e., the party encrypts its data objects using
the public key of the auditorial agent, and submits the en-
crypted data together with the transcript components for
matching. As a result, the receiving matching party gets
a data escrow that can be opened by the auditorial agent.
In a later “after the fact” detection phase either under the
demand of the other party or to go through certain regular
oversight formalities, a party is liable to attest the genuine-
ness of its “escrowed” data objects to the auditorial agent.
A challenge in this approach is to enable a party to con-
vince the other party that the same data objects are used
in escrow and for matching, while without revealing extra
information. Our basic idea is as follows. Suppose a data
object m is used by a party for matching. The matching
transcript includes two main components: the ﬁrst compo-
nent is hm = m
e used for data matching, where e is a ran-
dom number; the second is Cm = (c1 = m(PK)
r, c2 = g
r)
852
serving as the escrow of m, where PK is the public key (El-
Gamal encryption) of the auditorial agent, and r is another
random number. We then use a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge (e.g., [2, 3, 4]) to show that hm and cm1 contain
the same data object m.
Adversarial model. We assume malicious matching
parties in our system. A malicious party can act in arbitrary
ways, e.g., it can submit a spoof query by adding bogus data
to its private input, or terminate a protocol prematurely at
any point of execution.
System setup. Each of the two matching parties Al-
ice and Bob has a key pair for a standard digital signa-
ture algorithm. The matching parties need to sign the “es-
crowed” data to show their irrefutable involvement. We de-
note SIGNA(.) (resp. SIGNB(.)) the signing by Alice (resp.
Bob). The auditorial agent has a public-private key pair
〈y = gx (mod p), x〉 that corresponds to AlGamal encryp-
tion, where p = 2q + 1 is a large prime (q is also a prime),
and g ∈ QRp with QRp denoting the subgroup of quadratic
residues in Z∗p of order q. The system also decides on a
cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → QRp.
The protocol. For limit of space, we only present the
protocol for asymmetric private data matching, where Alice
eventually gets the matching result. The protocol is out-
lined below, where Alice has a genuine data set DSA =
{a1, a2, ..., aNA} of NA data objects, and Bob has a genuine
data set DSB = {b1, b2, ..., bNB} of NB data objects. We use
NPoK{(α) : y = gα} to denote the non-interactive “zero-
knowledge Proof of Knowledge of a value α such that y = gα
holds”, following the notations in [4].
1. Local computation by Alice:
(a) Alice picks a random number eA ∈R Zq.
(b) For each data object ai (i = 1..NA), Alice computes
hai = H(ai)eA (mod p), as well as ci1 = H(ai).yri
(mod p) and ci2 = g
ri (mod p), where ri ∈R Zq .
(c) Alice constructs a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge nPoKA = NPoK{(α, β1, ..., βNA ) :
∧NA
i=1(hai
(ci1)
α(1/y)βi ∧ 1 = (ci2)α(1/g)βi )}
(d) Alice signs CA = {(ci1, ci2) : i = 1..NA} by comput-
ing σA =SIGNA(CA).
(e) SA = ∅, SB = ∅.
2. Local computation by Bob:
(a) Bob picks a random number eB ∈R Zq .
(b) For each data object bj (j = 1..NB), Bob computes
hbj = H(bj)eB (mod p), and dj1 = H(bj).ysj (mod p)
and dj2 = g
sj (mod p), where sj ∈R Zq .
(c) Bob constructs a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge nPoKB = NPoK{(α′, β′1, ..., β′NB ) :
∧NB
j=1(hbj = (dj1)
α′ (1/y)β
′
j ∧ 1 = (dj2)α′ (1/g)β
′
j )}.
(d) Bob signs DB = {(dj1, dj2) : j = 1..NB} by comput-
ing σB =SIGNB(DB).
3. Alice sends to Bob {(hai , ci1, ci2) : i = 1..NA} together
with nPoKA and σA.
4. Bob does the following:
(a) Bob checks that σA is a valid signature on CA =
{(ci1, ci2) : i = 1..NA}.
(b) Bob checks the validity of nPoKA.
(c) Upon completing the above validation steps, Bob com-
putes vi = (hai )
eB (mod p) for each hai .
(d) Bob finally returns {(hbj , dj1, dj2) : j = 1..NB}, nPoKB ,
σB , and {(hai , vi) : i = 1..NA} to Alice.
5. Alice does the following:
(a) Alice checks that σB is a valid signature on DB =
{(dj1, dj2) : j = 1..NB}.
(b) Alice checks the validity of nPoKB .
(c) Upon completing the above validation, Alice computes
uj = (hbj )
eA (mod p) for each hbj , and includes uj
into SB , i.e., SB = SB ∪ {uj}, j = 1..NB .
(d) Alice includes each vi into SA, i.e., SA = SA∪{vi}, i =
1..NA. Alice determines {hai : vi ∈ SA ∩ SB}, and
from hai Alice decides the corresponding ai. The set
of ai thus formed is the matching result.
“After the fact” detection. In the “after the fact”
detection step, a matching party is required to attest the
genuineness of the data objects it escrowed in matching.
Let us suppose the auditorial agent gets {(ci1, ci2) : i =
1..NA} and σA from Bob, and asks Alice for attestation. The
auditorial agent ﬁrst checks whether σA is a valid signature
on {(ci1, ci2) : i = 1..NA}. Upon determining that the data
are indeed from Alice, the auditorial agent decrypts each
(ci1, ci2) to get h
′
ai = ci1/(ci2)
x (mod p) using its private
key x. Since the “escrowed data” h′ai is a hash value, Alice
is required to surrender the original data object a′i together
with the proof that vouches for the genuineness of a′i. The
auditorial agent checks whether h′ai = H(a′i) and whether
the proof supports that a′i is indeed a genuine data object.
Deterrent to spoofing attack. Our method of data es-
crow together with the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
forces the matching parties to correctly “escrow” the data
they use in matching to the auditorial agent. As a conse-
quence, if a matching party spoofs its input, it cannot pro-
duce to the auditorial agent valid proofs for the bogus data
objects. Depending on applications, failure to present cor-
rect attestation proofs for the data objects it uses in match-
ing, a party may face compromise of reputation or punitive
legal actions. We thus believe that leaving the evidence at
the auditorial agent for future spooﬁng investigation should
be a suﬃcient deterrent to spooﬁng attacks.
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